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Abstract 
As the Department of Defense (DoD) moves to a capability based approach for 
system definition and development, it has become necessary to evaluate System of 
System (SoS) characteristics for architectures.  Desired capabilities are often achievable 
only through seamless integration of many different systems.  As the classical system 
engineering approaches were not focused to effectively handle the complexity of SoS 
level concepts, an architecture-driven approach has emerged as a way of defining and 
evaluating these new concepts.  While the use of architectures for documenting and 
tracking interfaces and interoperability concerns is generally understood, architectural 
analysis and the use of executable models for evaluation of architectures remain an open 
area of research.  With this purpose in mind, this thesis applies architectural-based 
analysis to the proposed 2012 Time Sensitive Effect Operation (TSEO2012) scenario.  
This scenario becomes the baseline for architectural analysis, and an excursion from this 
baseline will add a Weapon Born Battle Damage Assessment (WBBDA) capability.  By 
creating an executable model, the two architectural designs can be compared.  The 
addition of a WBBDA capability to the TSEO architecture improves the efficiency of the 
time sensitive target (TST) operations by shortening the decision cycle for target re-
strike.  While this effort was successful in obtaining an executable model directly from 
the architectural description, it highlights the importance of having sufficient specific 
elements and correct information contained in the architecture products. 
xiv 
  
 
EXECUTABLE MODEL DEVELOPMENT FROM ARCHITECTURAL 
DESCRIPTION WITH APPLICATION TO THE TIME SENSITIVE TARGET 
PROBLEM 
 
I.  Introduction 
Problem Overview (Motivation) 
To obtain the desired capabilities from a new generation of weapon systems, the 
United States Air Force (USAF) is migrating to a capabilities based process.  The 
implementation of this process requires a new approach to perform and implement 
system engineering; the classical system engineering approach does not adequately 
handle the new System of System (SoS) [D&S04; 03].  To meet these complex system 
integration challenges, the USAF like the other services has adopted an architecture-
driven design approach based on the Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
(DoDAF). 
To support this architecture driven process, the following investigation is 
concentrated on direct migration from a static architecture to an executable model of that 
architecture and the subsequent validation and/or evaluation.  The desired end product 
(executable model and subsequent analysis) is viewed as an essential part in the 
validation of system design and the achievement of the desired capability.  [Levis03]. 
There are many theories of how the executable is an integral part in the validation 
process of an architecture, but no real practical experience has been documented thus far.  
It is the intent of this investigation to get practical knowledge of the intricacies of 
developing and using an executable model of an architecture. 
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 Arguably, an architecture-driven process is the most appropriate way to address 
the capabilities-based requirement and system development approach.  Heavy reliance on 
architectures motivates the question, “How do I know the architecture design will 
accomplish the desired results?”  The answer is the need to model the architecture to a 
sufficient level of detail in order to evaluate its behavior and performance.  A simulation 
should uncover any problems in the architecture and support early trade study 
development.  Results obtained in the simulations can be used early in the systems design 
process where changes to the architecture can be performed with minimal impact to the 
timeline and project cost. 
Executable architectures will be an essential tool to help filter undesirable design 
conflicts within an architecture.  They help validate the architecture as correct and 
complete products are needed for development of an executable model.  Incomplete 
architectural products will be detected in the development of the executable model as 
essential information will be missing.  By finding errors and performing trade studies 
early during system design, the DoD can develop an effective family of systems (FoS) 
that can deliver the desired capabilities on time and on budget.  In the current atmosphere 
of budget cuts and tight schedules, USAF can not afford systems that are unable to 
deliver the desired capabilities within some overall joint context. 
Weapon Born Battle Damage Assessment (WBBDA), the capability of attaining 
post-strike intelligence by integrating sensors with the munitions, has been documented 
for several years, but its ultimate utility to the warfighter has not yet been established.  
One of the reasons for this is the difficulty in determining the role and utility for 
2 
 WBBDA in the battlespace without actual fielding of the weapon system.  Without a 
utility analysis, the requirement generation for WBBDA is plagued with uncertainty.  
This type of capability assessment is one of the reasons the USAF is migrating to an 
architecture-driven process.  Capabilities only attainable through SoS level 
interoperability can be validated through architectural analysis.  Therefore, it is natural to 
apply this type of analysis using an executable model to the WBBDA concept.  The 
WBBDA concept represents a good example of a system of systems problem, where the 
interoperability of the entire system is an essential part of the desired capability. 
Consistency needs to be maintained through the generation of the executable 
model.  To ensure consistency we need a system design tool capable of maintaining an 
integrated dictionary, one that can relate the executable model back to the architecture.  
The CORETM system design tool was chosen for the development of the executable 
model and the integration of WBBDA.  Preference for CORETM over other alternatives 
was due mainly to its ability to maintain concordance between its many views, products, 
and integrated database.  CORETM was found to be more user friendly than other tools, 
with easy to navigate control tabs.  
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 Related Work 
The following studies and research show how architectures using the DoDAF can 
support the requirements and acquisition communities. 
Dickerson and Soules published a study titled “Using Architectures for Research, 
Development, and Acquisition” [D&S04].  The goal of the study was to show how 
architectures could be used to enable a capabilities-based approach for research, 
development, and acquisition of DoD systems that must interoperate with each other to 
conduct military operations [D&S04; preface].  Their investigation used pilot projects to 
explore the utility of the architecture methodology applied to a complex capability based 
SoS.  It was discovered that DoDAF products were not designed to analyze SoS, but they 
can be and have been adapted to support this function [D&S04; 148].  Therefore, 
architectures can be used as tools to develop integrated solutions for achieving desired 
mission capabilities.  Dickerson and Soules (D&S) broke down the Architecture 
Framework products into five distinct groups [D&S04; 11] shown in Table 1. 
The present investigation is primarily focused in the Architecture Performance 
and Behavior group.  This group supports trade studies and system engineering decisions; 
it also happens to be the most labor intensive of the groups.  The authors acknowledge 
the executable model as a new product required for both validation and analysis.  The 
executable model is an essential part in the development and execution of trade studies.  
However, Dickerson and Soules don’t give much insight into the executable model.  
They only propose it be used in conjunction with the other three products (OV-6c, SV-7, 
and SV-10) to observe the behavior and the performance of the architecture. 
4 
  
 
Table 1: Architecture Framework product grouping [D&S04; 11] 
 
Product Groups Architecture Products Description Purpose
Operational Concept
OV-1 High-Level Operational Concept 
Graphic
OV-2 Operational Node Connectivity 
Description
OV-4 Organizational Relationships Chart
OV-5 Operational Activity Model
System Functional Mapping
SV-3 System Matrix
SV-4 Systems Functionality Description
SV-5 Operational Activity to Systems 
Function Traceability Matrix
System Interface Mapping
OV-2 Operational Node Connectivity 
Description
OV-3 Operational Information Exchange 
Matrix
SV-1 System Interface Description
SV-2 Systems Communications Description
TV-1 Technical Standard Profile
SV-6 System Data Exchange Matrix
Architecture Performance and Behavior
OV-6c Operational Event/Trace Description
SV-7 Systems Performance Parameters 
Matrix
SV-10 System Activity Sequence and Timing 
Description
New product Executable Model
Acquisition Planning
SV-9 Systems Technology Forecast
TV-2 Technical Standards Forecast
SV-8 Systems Evolution Description
CV-6 Capability Evolution Description
Provide a description of the evolution and acquisition 
of the system improvements for the FoS that are 
traceable to mission capability requirements.
Provide the foundation for systems development  and 
facilitate communication by providing context, 
orientation, and focus.
Provide the linkage and traceability of capabilities 
and requirements flow-down between the operational 
and physical views.
Check that the appropriate standards been applied.
Check that the levels of interoperability have been 
properly aligned so that the individual systems in the 
FoS can be expected to interoperate with each other 
successfully to enable functionality.
Necessary to support trade studies and system 
selection decisions.
 
 
According to Dickerson & Soules, the architecture cannot be validated until it can 
be executed [D&S04; 14].  However, the sole presence of an executable model does not 
imply validation. 
5 
 Levis asserts that the DoDAF products along with the integrated dictionary 
contain all of the information needed to describe an architecture [Levis03].  The 
information contained in the products is necessary, but not sufficient, for evaluating the 
architecture.  For an effective evaluation, scenarios, key threads, and metrics are required.  
These opposing view of evaluation are integrated through the development of the 
executable model.  Correctly developed executable models can be implemented as a 
model and simulation (M&S) tool to support requirements validation and acquisition 
decisions.  Levis proposes the use of Colored Petri Nets (CPN) as a possible basis for the 
generation of the executable model, and provides guidance on how to analyze an 
architecture, once the executable model is available.  The analysis process is divided into 
layers; with each subsequent layer moving from abstract/general components to more 
concrete/specific components.  Table 2 depicts the layers of Levis’ analysis process 
[Levis04; 34-38]. 
In Levis’ view the optimum solution for solving the architectural analysis 
problem is the development of a new M&S tool specifically tailored for architecture 
evaluation [Levis04; ASC-39].  For Levis, the executable model is the mathematical 
model that enables simulation and the application of analysis [Levis04; 15].  Thus, he has 
promoted CPN for their mathematical robustness. 
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 Table 2: Layered analysis [Levis04; 34-38] 
Layer 1 - Is the architecture logically correct?
Is the architecture a correct implementation of the CONOPS?
Does the CONOPS work or are there logical inconsistencies?
Analytical tools and simulation are appropiate.
A discrete event dynamical executable model is essential for this 
analysis.
Layer 2  - Does the architecture exhibit the desired
                  behavior?
Are the desired behaviors in the operational view?
Analytical/algorithmic approaches as well as Modeling and Simulation 
approaches are appropriate.
Layer 3 - Do instantiations of this architecture exhibit the
                 desired performance characteristics?
To evaluate performance, system characteristics need to be included.
May cross hard-to-define architecture and system design boundary.
Requires the use of discrete dynamical system models and time-driven 
models.
Need to resolve the challenge of interconnecting time driven and event 
driven models.
Layer 4 - Do systems built in conformance to this
                architecture provide the desired capability?
Need to articulate capabilities and express them in measurable terms.
Formal construction of key threads.
Layer 5 - Analysis of alternatives
The desired end capability of comparing two distinct architectures that 
are designed under the same CONOPS. 
What metrics are appropriate for an impartial comparison?
How do I trace to architectural issuess the differences in performance 
f l i l d ?  
 
While Levis proposed the development of a new M&S tool for evaluation, Zinn 
explored the possibility of migrating information from a system’s architectural 
description (products) into an existing M&S tool.  The desired end result is to create a 
7 
 collaborative and quantitative infrastructure between the system acquisition community 
and the operational warfighting commands.  His proposed approach may be more 
palatable to the existing M&S community in that it uses existing, proven tools and 
processes.  Zinn investigated whether or not the DoDAF products, unmodified, contained 
all the data required for population of an agent based model with subsequent analysis.  
Through his study he found out that fully implemented DoDAF products should provide 
most or all of the information necessary to model a weapon system in an agent based 
simulation [ZinnB04], thus avoiding a redefinition of the system.  He also identified eight 
important products to describe a concept system for agent based modeling (OV-1, OV-5, 
OV-6a, SV-7, SV-2, SV-6 or OV-3, SV-1, and OV-4).  The products SV-7, OV-4 and 
SV-1 provide general information to the simulation endeavor, Figure 1.  The second set  
 
SEAS 
***** UNITS *****
Unit “USAF_CAOC” 
 
   Speed 0 
   Unit “F15_1” 
   Unit “F16_1” 
   Deploy Delay  ? 
   Bodies   ? 
   Weapon  “n/a” External
OV-4 
SV-7 
 
SV-1 
 
Figure 1: Mapping general attributes from DoDAF [ZinnB04; 59] 
 
of products, SV-7 and SV-6 or OV-3, provide specific communication descriptions as 
seen on Figure 2.  The last set of products, OV-1, OV-5, OV-6a, and SV-7, provide the  
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SEAS 
***** UNITS ***** 
Unit “USAF_CAOC” 
   Comm “TacAirT” 
 
***** COMM DEVICES ***** 
Comm “TacAirT” 
    Max_Range   5000 
    Message_Type  1 
    Modes         1 
SV-6 or 
 OV-3 
N O D E A
L oca l A rea  N et
S ystem  1 S ystem  2
S ystem  3 S ystem  4
Sy stem  5
E X T E R N A L
CO N N E C T IO N
(O U T SID E  T H E
N O D E S O F IN T E RE S T )
CO N N E CT IO N
T O  N O D E  B
CO N N E CT IO N
T O  N O D E  B
CO N N E C T IO N
T O  N O D E  C
T w o-W a y
C om m u nica tio ns
Link s
O ne -W ay
C om m u nic ations
Lin k
 
SV-2 
Check with OV-3 
(if SV-6 was used)  
and combine 
External
 
Figure 2: Mapping communications from DoDAF [ZinnB04; 62] 
 
ability to make logical decisions regarding behavior, Figure 3.  He concluded that OV-5 
and OV-6a were the most important products, as they provide most of the basis for the 
logical code of the executable model [ZinnB04; 59-68]. 
SEAS
***** UNITS *****
Unit “USAF_CAOC”
Orders
F15_tgts[0] = “T80”
F15_tgts[1] = “SA6”
While me_>Status == 2
Locate F15_PmassEn . . . 
External
Moni tor for Movement
Moni tor T arg et/Tar ge t
Sta tu s
P roject target movement
O
Target  Moni toring
X
Signif icant  M ovem en t Yes/ No
T ar get  U pdat e
Target Vec tor
Target Coordi nates
Track  Data
Sta tic  Target
AMTI/G MTI
OV-5 Report + 
pseudo code based 
off OV-6
OV-5
OV-6a
OV-1
conops
SV-7
 
Figure 3: Mapping orders from DoDAF [ZinnB04; 68] 
 
9 
 Approach 
To develop an executable model from a static architecture description, one needs 
to review thoroughly the product’s consistency and completeness.  After identifying any 
inconsistencies or errors, the architecture will be converted from Popkin System 
Architect to the CORETM software environment.  The first step of the migration is the 
creation of the Integration Definition for Function Modeling (IDEF0) diagrams in 
CORETM.  The IDEF0, along with the rules model and the information exchange matrix, 
are the key to identifying the threads necessary to introduce the WBBDA capability to the 
architecture.  Once the threads are identified, the products are then modified to reflect the 
addition of WBBDA.  Both the baseline and the WBBDA enabled architectures will be 
converted to executable models.  To initiate the development of the executable model, the 
information obtained from the IDEF0 diagram and rules model will be used to help 
generate the enhance FFBD.  The enhanced FFBD is an executable graphic based model 
which combines the activity/data flow diagram from IDEF0 with the control and logic 
structure represented in the FFBD.  Once the models are created a set of parameters are 
introduced to the different models.  The executable model will be exercised for varying 
values of the lethality parameters.  The data will be reduced and analyzed to compare the 
two architectures.  Care must be taken to develop a set of metrics that fairly compares the 
architectures.  A simple metric was selected for the comparison of the two architectures; 
number of sorties to an effective kill.  This metric is a top level assessment of the 
architectures that doesn’t depend on architecture specifics. 
10 
 Document Outline 
The second chapter of this thesis discusses the current use and importance of 
architectures in the Department of Defense.  This is followed by the description and 
current status of how Time Critical Targets are handled, both with and without the 
proposed Battle Damage Assessment capability in chapter three.  Chapter four provides 
details of the process used to perform the architectural analysis.  The results obtained and 
analysis performed is included in chapter five.  Finally conclusions and recommendations 
are covered in chapter six. 
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 II. Use of Architectures in DoD 
Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) 
The DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) provides a common description for 
architecture development, presentation, and integration [DoDAFI03; es-1].  The new 
approach needs to be able to break communication barriers throughout the acquisition 
community.  The desired end result is a common language that can communicate and 
relate architectures and systems across the many DoD and industrial organizations.  
DoDAF strives for a transparent exchange of information by developing three concurrent 
views; Operational View (OV), System View (SV), and Technical View (TV) as shown 
in Figure 4, illustrates the relationship between the three views. 
 
Figure 4: DoDAF architectural views interrelations [DoDAFI03; es-1] 
The views can be thought as of as photographs of the same system that are taken 
from different angles.  The operational view identifies “What needs to be accomplished?” 
and “Who does it?”  The System View relates systems and characteristics to operational 
needs.  The Technical View (technical standards view) prescribes standards and 
12 
 conventions.  The framework is partitioned into two volumes and a deskbook.  The 
resulting 26 individual views (see Table 3) each have a purpose, and the combinations of 
the views yield a complete and accurate representation of the system. 
The DoDAF defines an integrated architecture as an architecture description that 
has integrated Operational, Systems, and Technical Standards Views.  An architecture 
description is defined to be an integrated architecture when products and their constituent 
architecture data elements are developed such that architecture data elements defined in 
one view are the same as architecture data elements referenced in another view 
[DoDAFI03; ES-1].  A new product proposed by Dickerson and Soules, an executable 
model, can be used to help in the validation of the architectural design of a system 
[D&S04; 15].  Unfortunately the process and benefits of a direct migration from 
architectural products to an executable architecture are not well defined or understood. 
13 
 Table 3: Essential and Supporting Framework Products [DoDAFI03; 1-4] 
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 Representative use of DoDAF architectura  Views 
 
ent System (JCIDS), is established 
 satisfy the need for a joint concepts-centric capabilities identification process, see 
Table 4.  It is especially relevant as the TSEO2012 is a capability driven net-centric 
operation. 
Table 4: Principle JCIDS Analyses [DoDAFI03; 3-16] 
A, identify 
Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) for the capability gaps or redundancies identified in the 
FSA, assess the potential DOTMLPF approaches
l
The Joint Capability Integration and Developm
to
Functional Area Analysis (FAA) identify the tasks to be reviewed
Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) based on the tasks identified in the FN
capability gaps or redundancies
 
The Functional Area Analysis (FAA) is based on cross-capability analysis and 
identifies the tasks to be reviewed in the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA).  The 
Operational Activity Model (OV-5) used in association with the Universal Joint Task List 
(UJTL) can provide insight into the tasks to be accomplished, the relationships and 
information flows between those tasks, and the system functions from Systems Interface 
Description (SV-1) supporting the tasks.  Operational Rules Model, State Transition 
Description, and Event-Trace Description (OV-6) provide critical timing and sequence 
attributes, and documents the operational threads.  Operational Activity to Systems 
Function Traceability Matrix (SV-5) provides a basis for identifying activities not 
supported by existing materiel solutions [DoDAFv1VolI03; 3-16, 3-17]. 
FNA is performed for the tasks identified in the FAA step.  Key players and the 
operational information exchange requirements for tasks/activities of interest are 
identified in the Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2).  Systems 
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 Commu
cies 
e 
 
ach can fill the capability needs identified in the FNA.  The 
DOTLP
r skill set needed to conduct the activities (human roles 
n with 
• 
es 
The u ach 
to providing th c system solution.  The FSA 
sets the boundary conditions within which th Analysis of Alternative (AoA) should be 
performed [DoDAFv1VolI03; 3-17].  The SV-5 can be used with SV-1 and/or SV-2 and 
nication Description (SV-2) provides the basis for identifying existing 
connectivity.  SV-5 in conjunction with the system functions to systems mapping 
described in SV-1, contributes toward identifying capability gaps and redundan
[DoDAFv1VolI03; 3-17]. 
The first step for a Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) is to determine if th
integrated Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership & Education, Personnel, and
Facilities (DOTLPF) appro
F attributes are: 
• Doctrine influencing the activities (controls from OV-5) 
• Organizations responsible for activities (OV-2, operational nodes) 
• Training o
represented by operational nodes in OV-2) 
• Leadership and education (through OV-2 nodes and their associatio
the organizational hierarchy of OV-4) 
Personnel conducting operations 
• Facilities specified as systems nodes in SV-1, as well as operational 
threads (OV-6c) that describe capabiliti
 
 F nctional Solution Analysis (FSA) identifies the most promising appro
e capability, but should not define a specifi
e 
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 possibl
into five 
lows the system 
engineer to go directly to the products necessary to perform a specific analysis.  This 
in the 
relevan
y SV-4 to provide a basis for assessing various approaches for achieving a 
capability via materiel approach.  OV-3 may be used to describe information exchange 
requirements.  Technical standards (TV-1) may be applicable to factor technical 
constraints to the JCIDS analysis process [DoDAFv1VolII03; 3-17]. 
 
Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) Extensions 
As previously discussed Dickerson and Seouls have divided the products 
groups to support Architectural Analysis.  Grouping these products al
saves the system engineer from the task of reviewing all the products to obta
t information concerning his analysis.  Figure 5, represents how products support 
architectural analysis. 
 
Figure 5: Architectural product grouping [D&S04; 12] 
From the figure we can see a new architectural product, the executable model.  
The executable model was discovered to be essential in the Dynamic Interoperability 
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 analysis.  How this is the real enhancement, as it transform the diacritic products into 
dynamic analytical resources.  The products become dynamic, because as the model is 
executed the products become the parameters that are perturbed to obtain the desired 
performance and behavior (trade studies).  If the executable model is developed from the 
OV-1, OV-5 and OV-6a, as is performed later on the study, we can study the behavior of 
the system.  For a Dynamic assessment, Dickerson and Seouls require the following 
products, OV-1, OV-5, OV-6a, OV-6c, SV-7, and SV-10.  Comparing these products to 
those Zinn regarded as essential to populate an Agent based analysis we see an overlap of 
four pro
f 
cal 
 
es/analyzes different alternatives.  
Figure .   
ducts OV-1, OV-5, OV-6a, and SV-7.  We are narrowing down to the essential 
products needed to develop an executable model. 
Levis enforces the necessity of executable models as an important part of the 
system architecture validation process [Levis04] and favors CPN for the development o
the executable model.  CPN have the ability to handle the high demand for mathemati
rigor but fall short when modeling a variable (dynamic) environment. 
Levis’ take on Architecture validation takes the form of a layered process, with 
each increasing step requiring more effort and information.  The first layer tackles the 
logical correctness of the architecture.  The second layer verifies the architecture exhibits
the desired behavior.  The third level evaluates the performance characteristics of the 
architecture.  The fourth level explores the feasibility that the architecture provides the 
desired capability, and the last (fifth) layer compar
7 is a representation of how the Levis’ layered process fits our present problem
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 Table 5: Layered analysis process 
First layer (logic) Detect - Find disturbances
Elect - Rationalize the effect
Select - Build course of action
Affect - Shape the effect
Second layer (behavior) Engage target
Re-engage target in a non-kill scenario
Avoid infinite loops
Third layer (performance) Number of sorties to destroy target
Four layer (capability) Capability to terminate a high priority targets
Fifth layer (alternative analysis) Provability of system to effectivaly engage and 
number of sorties per mission.
terminate a high priority target given maximum 
Layer descriptions pertaining to the investigation (TSEO2012):
 
An executable mode d levels.  For Levis an 
executable model needs to have the following characteristics: 
1. It is derived from the architecture design in a traceable way 
2. It has an underlying mathematical model that enables the application of 
analytical tools 
3. It enables simulation 
Modeling and Simulation (M&S) 
The executable architecture can be a good starting point for any modeling and 
simulation effort.  The combination of information contained in the products and the 
behavior obtained from the executable model, give the M&S developer good insight into 
the intent of the architecture designer.  A good number of modeling errors arise from the 
miscommunication of the System Engineer (SE) and M&S developer.  An executable 
model can serve as a communication tool/enhancer between the SE and M&S developer.  
l is an essential part of all the layere
19 
 The de ht 
amount of detail is essential to determine the validity of the system, but too much detail 
can be ssarily drive up analysis costs.  The amount of detail in 
an executable model is not a constant that can be set as a rule for all executable 
architectures. 
Products provided by DoDAF should provide most of the information necessary 
to model a weapon system in an agent based simulation [ZinnB04; 91].  Eight important 
products for weapon system description for agent based modeling were identified (SV-7, 
OV-4, SV-1, SV-2, SV-6 or OV-3, OV-1, OV-5, and OV-6a).  We could use these 
products as a starting point for the development of the executable model.  The transition 
from an architecture to a M&S is similar to the migration to an executable model.  The 
differences lie in the level of detail that is wanted/needed for a good M&S model.  The 
M&S model tends to be more detailed than an executable model, requiring more 
extensive and precise supporting information.  Analysis using modeling and simulation is 
important at all stages of system development. 
 
 
 
 
 
gree of detail of the executable model is left to the systems engineer.  The rig
a hindrance and/or unnece
20 
 Summary 
The purpose of the executable model is to support architecture-based analysis.  
There are many perspectives regarding the use of architectural products to help in the 
development of an executable model.  Even as there is some debate as to which products 
re essential in the development of the executable model, there is consensus in that the 
roducts should be as complete as possible to provide for a smooth development and ease 
f traceability.  The architectural baseline used in this investigation had a limited number 
f architecture products available.  The three major contributors to the executable model 
where the OV-1, OV-5, and OV-6a.  Choice of architecture products is limited to the 
relevant available products. 
a
p
o
o
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 III. Operational Concepts 
Baseline Architecture Review 
Before establishing the architectural base line, the evolution of the Time Sensitive 
Effect Operation (TSEO2012) architecture will be discussed.  The TSEO2012 
architecture evolved from the Time Critical Target architecture (TCT2005) that is part of 
the Command and Control (C2) Constellation.  The C2 Constellation needed a near-term 
(2005) and a midterm (2012) perspective to manage the Time Sensitive Target Problem. 
To accommodate the new capability based approach adopted by the DoD, a new 
architecture is proposed to address the Time Sensitive Target Problem.  The new 
architecture addresses effects management instead of target prosecution.  By managing 
desired effects we can create the desired outcomes in the battlespace, thus controlling the 
tempo of the conflict.  This is a very different focus than the one which dominated during 
the Vietnam era mentality, which focused on quantity of kills rather than imposing our 
will on the enemy. 
The proposed TSEO2012 architecture is a planned evolution of the current 
TCT2005 architecture.  The targets’ hierarchical importance is determined by the effect 
obtained by removing it from the battlespace.  In contrast, the TCT2005 architecture 
gives hierarchal importance depending on the type of target, not taking into account its 
relevance in the battlespace or any effect obtained by removing the target from the 
battlespace. 
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 Table 6: Available Framework Products for C2, TCT2005 and TSEO2012 architectures 
Applicable 
Architecture 
View
Product 
Reference Architecture Product C2 TCT2005 TSEO2012
All Views AV-1 Overview and Summary Information Available N/A N/A
All Views AV-2 Integrated Dictionary Available N/A N/A
Operational OV-1 High-level Operational Concept Graphic Available Available Available
Operational OV-2 Operational Node Connectivity Description N/A N/A Available
Operational OV-3 Operational Information Exchange Matrix Available N/A Available
Operational OV-4 Command Relationships Chart N/A N/A N/A
Operational OV-5 Activity Model N/A Available Available
Operational OV-6a Operational Rules Model N/A Available Available
Systems SV-2 Systems Communications Description N/A N/A N/A
Systems SV-4 Systems Functionality Description Available N/A N/A
Systems SV-5 Operational Activity to System Function Traceability Matrix Available N/A N/A
Systems SV-6 System Information Exchange Matrix N/A N/A N/A
Systems SV-7 System Performance Parameters Matrix N/A N/A N/A
Systems SV-9 System Technology Forecast Available N/A N/A
Technical TV-1 Technical Architecture Profile Available N/A N/A
Technical TV-2 Standards Technology Forecast Available N/A N/A
 
Table 6 lists the architecture products available for the C2, TCT2005, and 
TSEO2012 architectures.  As shown, a limited number of products are available for both 
the TCT2005 and TSEO2012.  Fortunately the products available are important to 
develop the executable model.  We don’t have a specific description for the Overview 
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 and Summary (AV-1) for the TCT2005 and TSEO2012 architectures, as they are threads 
within the C2 Constellation, they share the AV-1 for that architecture.  The AV-1 for the 
C2 Constellation is shown in Table 7. 
Table 7: AV-1 pertaining to TCT2005 and TSEO2012 architecture 
Purpose Define the highest level aspects of the C2 Constellation but does 
not include all of the functionalities and associated systems.
Scope Represent a baseline and near-term view (2005) of the C2 
Constellation, along with a midterm (2012) perspective. By 
implementing a Monitor, Plan, Execute and Assess Framework.
Intended Users Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC).
Environment Theater wide, time sensitive operations to include Combat 
Search and Rescue (CSAR).  
The TSEO2012 architecture is an evolution of the TCT2005 concept, this 
evolution will now be discussed.  As shown in Figure 6 the Operational Concept Graphic  
2005 OV-1
Legend
Plan
Detect Locate Identify Decide Strike
AssessFind Fix Track Target Engage
 
Figure 6: TCT2005 Operator perspective.  Focuses on immediate 
unplanned/unanticipated targets (TST) 
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 (OV-1), the TCT2005 focus is on immediate unplanned/unanticipated targets (TST’s).  
The Operational Concept follows the Air Force paradigm of P-F2T2EA, which stands for 
Plan, Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess.  Unfortunately, the OV-1 graphic 
comes with no formal description other than the TCT framework of P-F2T2EA used for 
its creation.  An OV-1 without a textual description is an incomplete product.  Graphics 
alone are not sufficient for capturing the necessary architecture data [DoDAFII03; 4-1].  
It was necessary to review other architecture products in order to discern the complete 
concept of operations.  Table 8 provides some of the information that could be included 
with the OV-1 product. 
 
Table 8: TCT2005 activity breakdown [Vittori03] 
Phase Related Activity
Plan TCT-Analyze ATO period for dynamic targeting opportunities 
Find TCT-Monitor battlespace for dynamic events
TCT-Verify event/indication is of interest
Fix TCT-Adjust Theater ISR to support dynamic air operations
TCT-Define target/target set
Track TCT-Determine target significance/urgency
Target TCT-Validate target/target set
TCT-Nominate engagement option
Engage TCT-Execute engagement option
TCT-Attack target
Assess TCT-Conduct dynamic assessment of target 
 
Air Operations Center (AOC) staff use available Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) resources to update changes to the enemy status and build a list of 
25 
 potential targets that may disrupt the upcoming Air Tasking Order (ATO) flow (Plan).  
Throughout the ATO period, the AOC uses current information sources to discern 
anomalies or questionable occurrences.  A triggering event (e.g., a target appearance) 
must be verified, and a determination must be made as to whether or not it is a previously 
identified dynamic target or a new one (Find).  ISR resources may need to be adjusted to 
focus on the desired target or area.  The AOC uses target information to verify the 
location of, or fix the target/target set (Fix).  Utilizing track data and target information, 
the target/target set disposition and availability is determined (Track).  The target/target 
set is examined to see if it fits Joint Force Commander (JFC)/Joint Force Air Component 
Commander (JFACC) guidance, its impact on planned operations, and other imposed 
restrictions.  An engagement option is nominated through a weighted comparison 
(Target).  Execution orders are created and assets are instructed to engage the target 
(Engage).  Attacking assets and focused ISR provide damage assessment.  Target/target 
set status is determined and, if necessary, a decision to re-attack made (Assess).  With the 
previous modification, the OV-1 for TCT2005 is complete. 
The TSEO2012 architecture will now be discussed.  Starting with the Operational 
Concept Graphic (OV-1), Figure 7, the crucial textual description is missing/ not 
available again.  Enough information is scattered among the available products and 
supporting documents to determine that the TSEO2012 is focused on managing effects to 
influence the battlespace. 
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 2012 OV-1
Legend
Detect AffectSelectElect
 
Figure 7: TSEO2012 Simple construct that focuses on effect management, not merely 
target prosecution. 
 
The depicted construct looks simple compared to the TCT2005 construct, but both 
have the same number of underling activities.  These activities are modified from the 
previous architecture to better represent the effect driven focus of TSEO2012.  Table 9 
relates the activities to the OV-1.  Shown, the activities are divided into four phases, with 
the “Detect” phase carrying the bulk of the activities. 
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 Table 9: TSEO2012 activity breakdown [Vittori03] 
Phase Related Activity
Detect TSEO-Analyze Unplanned Immediate Targeting Opportunities
TSEO-Monitor Battlespace for Dynamic Events
TSEO-Verify Event/Indication is of Interest
TSEO-Adjust ISR to Support Dynamic/Time Sensitive Effects Operations
TSEO-Conduct Combat Identification (CID)
Detect/Elect TSEO-Predict Effect/Urgency
Elect TSEO-Validate Desired Effect
TSEO-Nominate Engagement Option
Elect/Affect TSEO-Manage Engagement
Affect TSEO-Produce Effect
Detect TSEO-Conduct Dynamic Assessment of Effect
 
A description of the TSEO cycle is shown in Figure 8, and this will serve as a 
textual description for the TSEO OV-1.  The TSEO cycle starts with an Unplanned 
Immediate Target Watch List (UITWL).  This is monitored for Unplanned Immediate 
TSEO Cycle
Disturbance Detection
Notification
EOI Determination
EOI
RFI
Verification
ISR Determination
Info
Data
EOI Identification
CID
TSE
Effect/Urgency Prediction
TSE
Effect Validation
TSE
TSEEngagement Mgt
Effect Execution
Effect Assessment
Option Development
Predicted 
Effect
Re-engagement Determination
Validated 
Effect
Engagement
Options
Orders
Control
Mission 
Status
Dynamic 
Assessment
UITWL
EOI – Effect of Interest
TSE – Time Sensitive Effect
UITWL – Unplanned Immediate Target Watch List
EOI
?
 
Figure 8: TSEO Cycle [Vitori03] 
 
Targets (UIT).  Upon detection of an anomaly or disturbance, concerned parties are 
notified and they begin to assess if it is an Effect of Interest (EOI).  The EOI is something 
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 that may impact ongoing or future operations.  It could be a threat or an exploitable 
opportunity.  Regardless, we need to identify the root causes of the effect.  Next, we 
analyze the EOI’s movement, predict its significance, and determine its urgency.  The 
EOI is designated as a Time Sensitive Effect (TSE); the desired outcome or effect is 
determined.  The TSE is then validated, to determine if it is desirable and worthwhile?  If 
so, engagement options are established and one is selected for execution.  AOC manages 
the engagement while assets carry out operations to create the desired effect.  ISR and 
engaging assets provide feedback; engagements are assessed rapidly.  This may result in 
a decision to re-engage [Vittori04].  Note that the architecture considers the engaging 
assets as part of the feedback loop.  An unfortunate side effect of autonomous, precision 
guided munitions with significant stand-off range is that the traditional “eyes on target” 
assessment information has become difficult to obtain. 
The noted difference from the previous architecture is the fact that the TSEO2012 
scrutinizes a list of available effects, selects the desired effect/outcome, and generates an 
engagement option.  In contrast the TCT2005 focuses on the available engagement 
options, reviews their effects and selects the engagement through a weighted comparison.  
The key words between the two are “engagement options and effects”.  TCT2005 has a 
set of engagements available to it when a target is identified the effects of the preset 
options are compared and the most advantageous is selected.  In contrast the TSEO2012 
look at the unpredicted events and decides what outcome is more desirable.  By selecting 
an outcome and pairing it with an engagement option, the architecture is not restricted by 
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 a fixed set of engagement options.  This new approach makes available a wider set of 
possibilities that were not available before. 
Because the TSEO2012 will serve as the basis for our analysis, important nodes 
and interactions will be identified by reviewing the Operational Activity Model (OV-5) 
and the Operational Activity Sequence (OV-6a).  The OV-5 is in the form of an IDEF0 
and supporting activity description document.  The graphical representation is mostly 
complete and legible, but sometime it tends not to follow strict IDEF0 graphical 
structures as shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10.  The IDEF0 was reconstructed in CORETM 
to facilitate its review.  The activity description document supporting the IDEF0 was  
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Figure 9: IDEF0 is segregated into blocks of three functions each.  [Vittori03] 
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 A9
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Figure 10: Functions on the corners are missing some inputs and outputs.  [Vittori03] 
 
adequate for this top level investigation, but it will need some expansion for more in 
depth investigation. 
The OV-6a is in the form of a Function Flow Block Diagram (FFBD) having a 
model description and unit behavior description supporting documents.  The OV-6a was 
lacking a top level system function FFBD diagram, an important piece of information for 
performing a top level analysis.  As observed in Figure 11, subfunctions FFBD diagrams 
are lacking important interface reference blocks. 
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Figure 11: Subfunction FFBDs have no supporting interface reference blocks.  [Vittori03] 
 
OV-6a documents describe elements of the diagrams, but does not provide any of 
the underlying logic, see Table 10 and Table 11.  This made deciphering the FFBDs more 
difficult.  The lack of precise structured rules makes difficult the study of lower level 
components, limiting the study to a top level interactions.  As the Top level FFBD is 
missing, a new one needs to be generated to support the development of an executable 
model. 
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 Table 10: Exert from OV-6a model description, provides no logic insight.  [Vittori03] 
Name 2012 OV-6a Model Description Need Purpose Scope
Manage Unplanned 
Immediate Target 
Watch List
This model describes the rules, processes 
and units of behavior associated with 
building and managing the Unplanned 
Immediate Target Watch List.  This model 
is based on a Major Theater War/Decisively 
Defeat scenario.  This model focuses on 
ops requirements and considerations 
associated with heavy planned tasking 
(2000+) missions within a 24 hour 
execution period; it could also apply to 
small scale tasking (less than 500 
missions).
Successful Time 
Sensitive Effects 
Operations begin with a 
clear understanding of 
those time-sensitive 
targets that may affect 
an upcoming execution 
period, but were not 
included in the planning 
process or have not been 
weaponeered. The 
UITWL provides the 
basis for that 
understanding.
This model establishes 
the baseline procedures to 
build and maintain the 
Unplanned Immediate 
Target Watch List 
(UITWL)
The model begins with a review of the 
current Dynamic Tasking Order and 
continues through the development 
and update of the UITWL.  It includes 
prioritization and preliminary 
weaponeering of Unplanned 
Immediate Targets.
Monitor Battlespace 
for Dynamic Events
This model describes the rules, processes 
and units of behavior associated 
battlespace monitoring during the DTO 
execution period.   This model is based on 
a Major Theater War/Decisively Defeat 
scenario.  This model focuses on ops 
requirements and considerations associated 
with heavy planned tasking (2000+) 
missions within a 24 hour execution period; 
it could also apply to small scale tasking 
(less than 500 missions).
In 2012, C2 Warriors will 
face hi-tech, effective 
challenges to ongoing 
operations and 
processes.  To face 
these threats, our 
Warriors need to cull the 
required data and 
information and quickly 
translate disturbances to 
provide warnings or 
notifications.
This model establishes 
the baseline procedures to 
monitor the battlespace 
and provide feedback 
through warnings or 
notifications.
The model begins with C2 Warriors 
looking out into the battlespace for 
anomalies.  Utilizing culled data and 
information inputs (to include inflight 
reports), C2 Warriors prepare and 
produce notifications or warnings.
 
 
Table 11: Exert from OV-6a Unit of Behavior (UOB) description.  [Vittori03] 
Name 2012 OV-6 Unit Of Behavior Description
Abort Engagement
Engager is in a position to strike, but can not confirm the target.

JP 3-09.3, pg. V-11, para 10
Abort Release
Engager determines target should not be engaged at that time.  For example, the TCT (a moving vehicle) has moved within 
a hospital compound and the engager fears collateral damage.

JP 3-09.3, pg. V-11, para 10
Acknowledge Weapon Control 
Status (WCS)/Changes
Engage and support assets acknowledge WCS and changes for the Time Sensitive Effects Operation.  

NOTE:  Weapons Free/Weapons Tight Control Orders impose a status or condition applicable to weapon systems within a 
defined volume of airspace.  Established US doctrine does not allow for further interpretation of weapons control orders 
against specific target under any circumstance.  Any reception of Weapons Free/Weapons Tight Control Orders against 
specific targets should be immediately clarified via voice request to higher authority.  

JP 3-01.3 (FC Draft, Nov 02), pg. IV-4, para 3e.
Analyze AMTI
Utilizing subscribed Air Moving Target Indicator data assets, C2 Warriors analyze tracks for anomalies.

Derived from JP 2-01.1, Pg. D-2, para 2a(2)  
 
 
Battle Damage Assessment & Weapon Born Battle Damage Assessment 
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) is an indispensable part of any force 
application mission.  The side that can correctly assess damage in a relatively short 
amount of time will have an advantage over his enemy and will likely control the tempo 
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 on the battlefield.  To obtain an accurate damage assessment we need sufficient and 
timely data regarding the engagement.  This has historically been accomplished by 
satellites, Intelligence Surveillance and Recognizance (ISR) platforms, aircraft 
controllers, and pilot feedback.  These monitoring capabilities are now being augmented 
with Uninhabited Air Vehicles (UAVs) and further improvements in surveillance 
technology.  The great amount of information taken from the encounters and sometimes 
sluggish reaction time of ISR platforms makes for a slow and sometimes back logged 
process.  Even with the sometimes slow pace of BDA, there is the potential for 
information overload, brought about by the large quantity of missions engaging targets of 
opportunity (Combat Air Patrol missions).  Due to increased standoff distance of modern 
weapons, real time BDA obtained from pilots and air-controllers observations is being 
lost at an increasing rate, and the accuracy of these assessments is often questionable at 
best.  Regardless, the observations gathered by these resources were valuable as an initial 
damage assessment to the target.  Proposed concept to address these limitations is that of 
WBBDA.  There are a number of proposed alternatives to implement WBBDA.  The 
basic concept is to obtain and utilize critical information available just before and 
immediately after a munitions strike.  The idea is to capture critical indicators that can be 
exploited.  To capture these critical events we will mount dedicated sensors on the 
munitions.  Placing the sensors which are both inexpensive and expendable, in close 
proximity to the point of impact, will enable fast and accurate data capture.  Figure 12 is 
one of the many WBBDA concepts currently under development and testing.  The 
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 information desired by the WBBDA will greatly benefit from the Weapon Data Link 
(WDL), an enabling concept for WBBDA.  The WDL is a technology development and  
 
Figure 12: Fuze BDA is one of the many proposed WBBDA 
 
demonstration effort to enhance the functionality of autonomous and semi-autonomous 
munitions through the use of a common, shared data link among strike and C2 platforms.  
For the purpose of this investigation we are assuming the presence of an effective WDL.  
The data obtained from WBBDA can be used to determine the status of the target, near 
real-time, at the time of engagement.  Due to the fast turn around time, re-strike orders 
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 can be given to attacking or close by assets.  By adding these new threads (information 
paths) to the TSEO2012, we expect an improvement in the effectiveness of the 
architecture to engage and destroy time sensitive, high priority targets. 
The addition of WBBDA capability to the proposed TSEO2012 architecture 
provides insight into the type of analysis and studies that can be performed by the 
executable models.  By modifying the architectural baseline and observing the change in 
behavior of the executable model, we can get a perspective on the usefulness of the 
executable model to detect/highlight changes in the architecture.  The architectural 
baseline was modified to include the effects of weapon born BDA.  Through the 
executable model, we can observe the effects BDA had on the behavior of the 
architecture.  To obtain a good representation of the behavior of the system two types of 
warheads will be used, raising the number of effective executable models to four.  The 
four models will provide enough variation to develop a good representation of the 
systems behavior. 
 
Summary 
As depicted in Table 12, only four products match the recommendation given by 
Zinn for populating an Agent Based simulation.  These products are the following; OV-1, 
OV-3, OV-5, and OV-6a.  Out of these four, OV-5 and OV-6a will form the building 
blocks of our executable model.  Even as the TSEO2012 provided a good amount of 
supportive information in the form of architecture products, it still represents a challenge 
to understand its structure.  Due to the lack of a complete rules model that clearly defines 
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 sublevel logic the analysis is limited to top level components.  This limitation will not 
hinder the analysis as we are interested in how executable models support architectural 
base analysis and how WBBDA affects the overall behavior of the system. 
Table 12: Products necessary for simulation 
Applicable 
Architecture 
View
Product 
Reference Architecture Product
Necessary 
for Agent 
Based 
Simulation
TCT2005 TSEO2012
Operational OV-1 High-level Operational Concept Graphic Necessary Available Available
Operational OV-3 Operational Information Exchange Matrix Necessary N/A Available
Operational OV-4 Command Relationships Chart Necessary N/A N/A
Operational OV-5 Activity Model Necessary Available Available
Operational OV-6a Operational Rules Model Necessary Available Available
Systems SV-2 Systems Communications Description Necessary N/A N/A
Systems SV-6 System Information Exchange Matrix Necessary N/A N/A
Systems SV-7 System Performance Parameters Matrix Necessary N/A N/A
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Name 2012 OV-5 Activity Description
TSEO 9.0 Manage Engagement (Select/Affect) The selection process resulting in an engagement option and execution orders directing a
desired effect.

From:
CAOC 4.5.2.9; 2005 C2 Constellation 3.2.5.5; 2005 TCT Activity 9; AOC CONOPS 3.2.5.
3.2, pg. 373, para A3.11.1.2.1.4
TSEO 11.0 Conduct Dynamic Assessment of 
Effect (Detect)
Attacking assets as well as focused ISR provide effect assessment.  This information may
back through the TSE process to determine effect status and if necessary, urgency of reat

From:
2005 C2 Constellation 3.2.5.7; 2005 TCT Activity 11; AFOTTP 2-3.2, pg. 368, para A3.10.
360, A3.6.2.11; AFPAM 14-210, pg. 71, para 9.4; JP 2-01.1, pg. VI-3, para 2d(3) and pg. D
IV.  Methodology 
Architecture Modifications 
Before starting the development of the executable model we need to determine 
how to integrate the WBBDA capability into the existing architecture.  The first step is to 
identify the critical functions that will facilitate a re-strike action.  Table 13 depicts the 
two identified functions that will enable the integration of WBBDA.  Function TSEO 9.0, 
Manage Engagement (Select/Affect), is responsible for assigning the assets to create the 
desired effect.  Function TSEO 11.0, Conduct Dynamic Assessment of Effect (Detect), is 
responsible for determining the target status.  Because of its responsibilities TSEO 9.0 is 
a good candidate function to receive the WBBDA assessment output from TSEO 11.0.  
This will bypass TSEO6.0-Predict Effect/Urgency (Detect/Elect), TSEO 7.0-Validate 
Desired Effect (Elect), and TSEO 8.0-Nominate Engagement Option (Elect) in the re-
strike feedback loop, see Figure 13, greatly reducing time to re-engage.  It is important to  
Table 13: Critical functions for WBBDA implementation [Vittori03] 
ssets to create the 
2.1.5; AFOTTP 2-
 be used to cycle 
tack.
2.2.5.4.2 and pg. 
-3, para 2f.  
realize that we are assuming a quick response time from the WBBDA; the short response 
time will not allow any significant status changes/permutations in any of the three 
functions (TSEO 6,7,8).  This assumes that the validated effect and engagement options 
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Figure 13: TSEO 9.0 and TSEO 11.0 are identified as important functions.  Existing links can accommodate any extra data. 
TSEO 11.0 
TSEO 9.0 
WBBDA data 
Original re-attack loop 
 
 obtained from this chain of functions are still valid and appropriate due to a relative short 
elapsed time.  Taking a top level perspective, we need only to add a new link (WBBDA 
assessment) from TSEO 11.0 to TSEO 9.0; no other links are needed because we are 
taking advantage of the existing data links by expanding their domain to accommodate 
any new information that may be generated.  To integrate this new data stream with the 
WBBDA, an upgrade to the existing overburdened communication hardware must be 
implemented.  The WDL provides the capability of in-flight communications to maintain 
command authority until detonation; receives in-flight coordinate updates, transmits 
weapon position and status up to time of impact, transmits damage assessment data, and 
communicate through direct line-of-sight or SATCOM reachback. 
3
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Figure 14: Level 1 of the TSEO 11.0 
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 Below this top level modification, it is necessary to further decompose TSEO 11.0 
to can support the addition of the desired WBBDA thread.  Figure 14 shows that it can 
support WBBDA via function TSEO 11.2, Perform Preliminary Effects Assessment.  In 
this function, sensor data can be analyzed to obtain an assessment of the physical 
condition of the target.  The domain of “ Sensor Data” can be increased to accommodate 
the extra information made available by the WBBDA.  This use of the domain set can 
decrease the complexity of the modified IDEF0. 
We add TSEO 11.2 that performs a quick analysis of the functional target status; 
this will be implemented in a lower level decomposition of TSEO 11.2.  As shown in 
Figure 15 the new WBBDA data is processed and an assessment is obtained.   
Top LevelNext Level Up
Detect
A11.2
2
TSEO 11.2 Perform
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3
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Re-attack (WBBDA triggered)
WBBDA specific data 
Figure 15: WDBBA data is analyzed with high priority on TSEO 11.2.1. 
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Looking at TSEO 10.0, an obvious choice for the correct placement for the 
WBBDA is in the subfunction TSEO 10.6-Perform Weapon Delivery, see Figure 17. 
While the processing of the WBBDA data has been shown, we need to establish 
where the data is obtained.  Returning to level 1, see Figure 14, we see that the “Sensor 
Data” is an input to the functions TSEO 11.1, Collect Data to Support Dynamic 
Assessment of Effects, and TSEO 11.2, Perform Preliminary Effects Assessment.  
Moving one level up we can now see two set of inputs labeled Sensor Data, see Figure 
16.  We are only interested in the data stream provided by the TSEO 10.0, Produce Effect 
(Affect), because this function houses the information required to perform WBBDA.  
While there is no real advantage to simulating down to level 2, it is beneficial to design at 
this level to get a clear understanding of the underlying process. 
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Figure 16: TSEO 11.0 is feed sensor data by two different functions. 
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Figure 17: Decomposition of TSEO 10.0 
TSEO 10.6 will contain 
the WBBDA function 
 
 This function represents the actual attack on the target; the information gathered just prior 
to and post detonation is essential to the BDA.  The ability to acquire the necessary data 
can be obtained by adding the subfunction TSEO 10.6.4-WBBDA, Figure 18.  Figure 19 
depicts the original decomposition of function TSEO 10.6-Perform Weapon Delivery.   
WBBDA Sensor Data
Sensor Data
Mission Flow 2
INFLIGHTREP
ENGSTS
Damage Solution
Onboard Dedicated Sensors
TSEO 10.6.4
Perform WBBDA
 
Figure 18:  Proposed TSEO10.6.4 WBBDA 
 
We can see a number of essential flows (i.e., Sensor Data, INFLIGHTREP, etc.) are 
available as defaults in the original decomposition.  Taking advantage of this data, and 
additional information gathered by dedicated sensors to perform a quick BDA.  In Figure 
20 we see how the proposed function integrates into TSEO 10.6.  The TSEO 10.6.4 
function assumes the seamless integration of available relevant data sources.  In theory 
this will provide economy of volume for the dedicated WBBDA hardware. 
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Figure 19: Original TSEO 10.6 Perform Weapon Delivery 
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Figure 20:  Modified TSEO 10.6 Perform Weapon Delivery 
 
45 
 Having identified the necessary additions to the architecture, the rules model can 
then be modified.  As previously mentioned, the top level FFBD was missing, thus it 
needed to be recreated.  This top level FFBD is especially important for an executable 
model to perform architectural analysis.  The lack of reference blocks, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, can be a major road block as transitions from one FFBD to another can 
be confusing.  Figure 21 represents an example of this type of road block.  The exit state 
of function TSEO 1.0 is not clearly defined; the reference blocks are missing along with 
exiting thread information.  This leaves ambiguity as to how subfunctions TSEO 1.1.18 
connects to subfunctions TSEO 2.1.1 and 2.1.8, if they connect at all.  To make maters 
worse OV-6a goes directly to the lowest available level of detail with a different 
numbering system as OV-5, making traceability to the top levels harder. 
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Figure 21: FFBD interactions 
 
In moving to a level 1 FFBD, Figure 22 shows how to reduce the parallel threads as they 
are part of TSEO 1.2, yielding a sequential representation.  The same can be done for the  
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Figure 22: Reducing the FFBD from level 2 to level 1 
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following subfunctions in Figure 23.  Again at level 1, the model is reduced to a 
sequential order.  The simplification of the TSEO 2.0 function is shown in Figure 24, 
which represents an interesting occurrence as there is a redundant representation of  
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Figure 23: FFBD reduction from level 2 to level 1 
 
TSEO 2.1, Monitor Sensor.  They will be considered as one single TSEO 2.1 and this will 
yield a parallel configuration with TSEO 2.2, Process Inflight Report.  It will be assumed 
that TSE0 1.7 feeds both TSEO2.1 and TSEO 2.2 at the same time.  But as can be seen 
there is no construct to determine if both functions are needed to continue or if one is  
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Figure 24: Irregularities in TSEO 2.0 consolidation 
 
sufficient to continue.  Because both functions handle dynamic information we will 
assume that either one is sufficient to continue the execution.  Figure 25 shows the simple 
reduction of functions TSEO 2.3 to TSEO 2.6.  In this figure we have an exit function 
that we assume goes to reference.  Figure 26 represents the reduction of TSEO 3.1.  Most 
of the subfuctions are in parallel and only one is needed to continue the execution of the 
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Figure 25: Cont.  TSEO 2.0 Monitor Battlespace for Dynamic Events 
 
other functions.  TSEO 3.1 feeds directly to TSEO 3.2 see Figure 27.  As shown there is 
an anomaly with function TSEO 3.3, the exclusion construct splits the paths of function  
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TSEO 3.3.  The construct has two alternatives which continue to TSEO 3.4 or exit to 
reference.  Figure 28 depicts the start of reduction of the TSEO 4.0 function.  The 
underlying subfunction structure of the TSEO 4.0 has multiple ramifications that make up 
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 the logic of this top level function.  The branching starts after the TSEO 4.0 function, see 
Figure 29, where it branches to the TSEO 4.4 function (Figure 30) or functions TSEO 
4.3.4 and 4.3.5 (Figure 36).  The branching is internal to the TSEO 4.0 function and 
represents the different alternatives, see Figure 30 to Figure 37.  All alternatives end in 
the same exiting subfunction TSEO 4.10.  
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Figure 30:  Cont. TSEO 4.0 Adjust ISR to Support Dynamic/Time Sensitive Effects 
Operations 
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Figure 31:  Cont. TSEO 4.0 Adjust ISR to Support Dynamic/Time Sensitive Effects 
Operations 
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Figure 32:  Cont. TSEO 4.0 Adjust ISR to Support Dynamic/Time Sensitive Effects 
Operations 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33:  Cont. TSEO 4.0 Adjust ISR to Support Dynamic/Time Sensitive Effects 
Operations 
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Figure 34:  Cont. TSEO 4.0 Adjust ISR to Support Dynamic/Time Sensitive Effects 
Operations 
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Figure 35: Cont. TSEO 4.0 Adjust ISR to Support Dynamic/Time Sensitive Effects 
Operations 
 
 
54 
  
 
 
Figure 36: Cont. TSEO 4.0 Adjust ISR to Support Dynamic/Time Sensitive Effects 
Operations 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37: Cont. TSEO 4.0 Adjust ISR to Support Dynamic/Time Sensitive Effects 
Operations 
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 As can be seen in Figure 38 the reduction of TSEO 5.0 is very simple due to its small 
number of functions.  TSEO 6.0 decomposition starts in Figure 39.  It has a number of 
parallel functions that end in an “or” construct that branches to TSEO 7.0 or TSEO 8.0.   
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Figure 38:  TSEO 5.0 Conduct Combat Identification 
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Figure 39:  TSEO 6.0 Predict Effect/Urgency 
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 For the first attack the branch selected leads to the TSEO 7.0 function and for every 
consecutive attack, the branch selected leads to TSEO 8.0.  This can be observed from 
Figure 39 to Figure 41, where Figure 41 contains the “or” construct. 
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Figure 40:  Cont. TSEO 6.0 Predict Effect/Urgency 
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Figure 41:  Cont. TSEO 6.0 Predict Effect/Urgency 
 
TSEO 7.0, Validate Desired Effect, is the function that it is circumvented, in the original 
architecture, to expedite the reattack actions.  The subfuctions that compose TSEO 7.0 
can be observed on Figure 42 to Figure 45.  The logic structure is somewhat confusing  
 
 
 
Figure 42:  TSEO 7.0 Validate Desired Effect 
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  7.1.7
Review LOAC, SROE,
and ROE
7.1.6
Review No
Strike/Restricted
Target List
7.1.5
Review Dynamic
Targeting Execution
Direction and Guidance
&
Validation Reviews
&
Validation Criteria
X
Meets Validation Criteria Yes/No
X
Listed  Yes/No
Criteria Input
LOAC, SROE, ROE Review
No Strike/Restricted Target List Review
Direction and Guidance Review
Validation Review
Validation Review
Validation Review
Not Listed (Unanticipated)
TSEO 7.4 
TSEO 7.4.1 
TSEO 7.4.2 
TSEO 7.4.3 
Figure 43:  Cont. TSEO 7.0 Validate Desired Effect 
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Figure 44:  Cont. TSEO 7.0 Validate Desired Effect 
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Figure 45:  Cont. TSEO 7.0 Validate Desired Effect  
 
but all branches lead to the same exit TSEO 7.8 function.  TSEO 8.0, Nominate 
Engagement Option, is a number of groupings of parallel functions connected in series.   
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Figure 46:  TSEO 8.0 Nominate Engagement Option  
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 Compared to the previous functions, TSEO 8.0 has a straightforward logic construct.  The 
TSEO 8.0 functions can be observed on Figure 47 to Figure 49.  The functional  
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Figure 47:  Cont. TSEO 8.0 Nominate Engagement Option  
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Figure 48:  Cont. TSEO 8.0 Nominate Engagement Option 
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Figure 49:  Cont. TSEO 8.0 Nominate Engagement Option 
 
decomposition for TSEO 9.0 starts in Figure 50 and ends in Figure 52.  TSEO 9.0 has an 
exit point to reference which can be seen on Figure 50.  The functions end on TSEO 9.5.  
This function is a collection of parallel subfuctions; unfortunately, there is no guidance of 
how the functions of TSEO 9.5 connect to the following function (see Figure 52). 
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Figure 50:  TSEO 9.0 Manage Engagement 
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Figure 51: Cont. TSEO 9.0 Manage Engagement 
 
 
 
9.1.13
Process Mission Change
Request(s)
9.1.12
Issue Fire Control Order
9.1.11
Provide Time Sensitive
Effects Operation
Status
9.1.10
Provide Positive Control
9.1.9
Provide Procedural
Control
O
Order Dissemination
O
Manage Execution
Inflight Report
Mission Update
Mission Update
Mission Update
Mission Update
Disseminated Order(s)
TSEO 9.5 TSEO 9.5.1 
TSEO 9.5.2 
TSEO 9.5.3 
TSEO 9.5.4 
TSEO 9.5.5 
Figure 52:  Cont. TSEO 9.0 Manage Engagement 
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Figure 53:  TSEO 10.0 Produce Effect 
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Figure 54:  Cont. TSEO 10.0 Produce Effect 
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Figure 55:  Cont. TSEO 10.0 Produce Effect 
 
 
Figure 56:  Cont. TSEO 10.0 Produce Effect 
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Figure 57:  TSEO 11.0 Conduct Dynamic Assessment of Effect 
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igure 59 represents the top level FFBD of the baseline TSEO 2012.  This figure shows 
l 
st 
 
 
Figure 58:  Cont. TSEO 11.0 Conduct Dynamic Assessment of Effect 
 
F
two constructs that are important to the executable model.  The first one is the conditiona
exit criteria from TSEO 6.0 that allows the system to bypass function TSEO 7.0 when 
performing a re-attack order.  The second construct is the loop feature after function 
TSEO 11.0.  The loop will be active as long as the target is considered alive.  The mo
important functions for executable development will be TSEO 6.0, TSEO 10.0, and 
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TSEO 11.0.  TSEO 6.0 must determine when the executable is performing a re-attack 
loop.  The damage will be calculated on TSEO 10.0, the target status and executable 
termination is determined on the function TSEO 11.0. 
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Figure 59: Top level FFBD 
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 Core Environment 
Having a more comprehensive view of the architectural logic, the creation of the 
executable model can begin.  The first step is to import all the functions generated for the 
IDEF0 on CORETM [Vitech02] to the Enhanced FFBD CORETM environment.  The 
import from IDEF0 also makes available the inputs, outputs, resources, and triggers 
associated with each function.  By default, CORETM displays the top level functions in a 
serial configuration.  It is the responsibility of the investigator to arrange the functions in 
a configuration that supports the logic of the architecture. 
This study will concentrate on the thread that supports the re-strike capabilities of 
the architecture.  In doing so, only part of the architecture will be simulated.  This limits 
the simulation to a top level perspective, saving extensive time in modeling.  Each 
function will have a time duration drawn from a probability distribution.  In essence we 
are going to do a first level FFBD (TSEO X.X) to determine the logic of our model, but it 
is represented and executed in the Enhanced FFBD as a level zero (TSEO X.0).  For 
some of our critical functions we will go to a level one to develop the underlying 
algorithms that will determine the behavior of the system. 
The top level FFBD is relatively simple to generate in CORETM.  Once the 
functions have been transferred to the EFFBD CORETM environment we need to arrange 
the functions in logical order before we can introduce any logical constructs.  The first 
logical construct is to create two exit criteria for function TSEO 6.0.  The first exit branch 
will connect function TSEO 6.0 to TSEO 7.0, the second one will bypass TSEO 7.0 and 
connect TSEO 6.0 directly to TSEO 8.0.  The bypass will be activated on a re-attack 
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 loop, as the desired effect is assumed to be still valid.  This rule can be observed in Figure 
41.  The exit criteria for this logical construct can be observed in Table 14 and the FFBD 
construct can be observed in Figure 60.  The remaining function blocks are set in series.   
Table 14: Exit criteria for TSEO 6.0 
Criteria Exit Condition Criteria
Exit 
Condition Criteria
Exit 
Condition Criteria
No Exit to REF
Yes Continue to TSEO 7.0
No Continue to TSEO 7.0
Yes Continue to TSEO 8.0
Does the target require 
immediate re-attack?
Is the target Time 
Sensitive? Yes Is it a new target?
No
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Figure 60: TSEO 6.0 exit construct 
 
The second logical construct is housed in function TSEO 10.0, where kinetic energy is 
applied to the target.  The underlying construct can be observed in Figure 61.  The 
function “time delay 3” sets the statistical parameters for the time duration of the top 
level function TSEO 10.0, as the remaining factions will be set to zero duration.  The 
“Effect” function will determine the target level health and its exit criteria will assess the 
actual damage to the target.  The BDA damage assessment algorithm is integrated into 
function TSEO 11.0; see Figure 62.  “Time Delay 4” will impart a stochastic time 
duration distribution to the top level function TSEO 11.0, the “Sensor” function has zero 
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 duration.  The exit criteria from function “Sensor” will determine the status of the targets 
health.  The exit criteria can be seen on Table 15.  To change the current FFBD to support  
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Figure 61:  Effect assessment algorithm 
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Figure 62:  BDA damage assessment algorithm 
 
Table 15: Exit criteria for "Sensor" function 
Criteria Exit Condition Criteria
Yes Exit to REF
No Continue to re-strike loop
Is the TargetHealth < 20%?
 
WBBDA we need to add an iteration construct that houses the following functions (see 
Figure 63); TSEO 9.0, TSEO 10.0, and TSEO 11.0.  The iteration construct allows for the 
shortened decision cycle obtained through WBBDA.  A quick assessment of the damage 
can be obtained by the attacking assets, allowing rapid reallocation resources to the  
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Figure 63: Iteration construct for modified FFBD 
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 target.  To further emphasize the quickness of the assessment, the stochastic time delay 
that governs the TSEO 11.0 function is half of the original time delay.  Five iterations 
will be the maximum iterations to be performed per attack loop cycle.  The five iterations 
are meant to be representative of an aircraft carrying five warheads.  After the iterations 
are completed the loop function will be activated, just like the original system, and a new 
WBBDA supported attack run will be performed.  Figure 64 and Figure 65 are a 
comparison of the top level FFBDs of the two systems.  As it can be seen the most  
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Figure 64: Top level original EFFBD 
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Figure 65: Top level modified EFFBD 
 
notable difference is the iterating construct that encompasses the TSEO 9.0, TSEO 10.0 
and TSEO 11.0 functions. 
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 Summary 
Through the analysis and modification of the rules model, it was determined there 
is no advantage in representing the rules model to the lowest levels available.  The 
extensive breakdown of the FFBD forces the investigator to work with varying logic 
details across the executable model.  This provides a more natural way of understanding 
the critical logic that governs the architecture.  Once the appropriate FFBD levels were 
generated the appropriate level of detail for the executable model could be determined.  It 
was decided to implement a top level executable model for a preliminary capability 
assessment of the viability of WBBDA. 
With the breakdown of the different levels we can discern and model the parts 
necessary to evaluate the level of target destruction.  Parts not modeled are given a 
stochastic time duration representative of that function only.  No effort was made to 
implement other “what if?” scenarios (i.e. the loss of a link, loss of attacking asset).  The 
focus is to determine the effect of WBBDA on sortie effectiveness.  The functions were 
only simulated to the lowest level needed to capture their behavior; functions were 
discomposed enough to decipher the underlying logic that determines the system 
behavior. 
To obtain the desired behavior of a weapon born BDA concept, we added an extra 
sub-function that determined the probability of kill by the use of a simple probability 
distribution.  Two different warheads where selected, one with 50% lethality and the 
second with 75% lethality.  This will provide some indication of the lethality for the 
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 WBBDA concept.  New data links where added to the architecture to simulate the 
shortening of the chain of events to perform a re-strike to a time sensitive target. 
For an effective comparison and assessment of the WBBDA capabilities an 
unbiased metric needs to be adopted.  The metric must be one that can directly compare 
the two architectures.  For this metric we chose the number of sorties needed to destroy a 
target.  By performing a Monte Carlo analysis we can develop a probability distribution 
for the number of sorties needed to destroy a target. 
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 V.  Results and Analysis 
Test Set Up 
Assets can be viewed as five distinct attack aircraft, an aircraft that carries five 
warheads, or a combination of both.  To better depict WBBDA the TSEO 11.0 function 
has a reduced stochastic time component, the shorter time will benefit both threads (i.e., 
loop and iteration constructs).  The amount of damage to the target will be determined in 
function TSEO 10.0.  Targets are assumed stationary with the ability to regenerate with 
the passage of time.  This is an artificial construct taken to highlight the time critical 
aspect of the target.  It is important to mention that the ability to obtain shorter response 
time through the use of WBBDA is not in question; this is assumed.  The amount of 
regeneration is dependent on the elapsed time until re-strike.  For purposes of the 
executable model the target is considered destroyed when target integrity is below 20% 
of maximum value. 
The executable marks the time in seconds but we will transform to minutes.  The 
execution time for each function will be determined by a stochastic time variable. 
The number of sorties per kill is used as the comparison metric between the 
performance of the baseline and the modified system.  There will be four data points; 
each data point will be provided by a different executable model or valve for warhead 
lethality.  For purpose of obtaining good statistical data we will perform one hundred 
Monte Carlo simulations per data point.  A 95% confidence level will be applied to the 
test data and respective error bounds will be calculated.  The data will be decomposed by 
histogram and a best statistical fit will be found. 
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 To start the executable model we need to generate some global function triggers 
(see Figure 66).  These triggers are a fallout of the IDEF0 and Rules model and need to 
be generated a number of times equal to the number of time we want to activate an 
specific function.  These external triggers represent the external influences that help 
govern the system.  The triggers can serve as a fail safe to avoid the case of infinite  
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Figure 66:  FFBD of Universe function 
 
execution.  These triggers are generated through an iteration construct and the iteration 
domain was set to an arbitrary number large enough not to inferior with the execution of 
the model.  After the triggers are generated the simulation starts on function TSEO 1.0 
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 and continues through to function TSEO 5.0.  As these function are in series, no special 
manipulation is necessary.  Once the TSEO 6.0 function is executed a query is made to 
determine if the current thread is a re-strike operation.  If the answer is NO the function 
will continue to function TSEO 7.0; otherwise the function will continue to the TSEO 8.0 
function.  Until this point both executables have a similar construct, see Figure 67 and 
Figure 68.  Both executables also flow through TSEO 9.0, TSEO 10.0 and TSEO 11.0. 
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Figure 67:  EFFBD of the original system 
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Figure 68:  EFFBD of the modified system 
 
On TSEO 10.0 we determine the damage that has occured to the target and the amount of 
regeneration (zero for first attack) undergone by the target.  After damage is applied 
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 function TSEO 11.0 will determine if enough effects were seen.  For a confirmed kill, 
both simulations will exit to reference, ending the execution.  This is the point where the 
threads of the executables diverge.  For an unsuccessful kill the original model will be 
dominated by the loop construct, returning to the TSEO 6.0 function.  This time the exit 
criteria will identify the thread as a re-attack action and the bypass will be executed.  The 
function flow will continue from TSEO 8.0 through TSEO 11.0 where another exit query 
is performed.  The loop will continue until the target is destroyed or the global triggers 
are exhausted.  In contrast the modified model will execute the iteration construct 
returning to TSEO 9.0 and continue through function TSEO 11.0 where the exit query is 
performed.  The iteration is performed until the target is destroyed or the iteration domain 
is satisfied (five iterations).  If the iteration domain is satisfied before the target is killed 
the loop construct will be activated.  By activating the loop construct the execution thread 
will revert to the TSEO 6.0 function, effectively resetting the previous chain of events.  
The loop construct is always active, so as long that there is no kill confirmation and the 
iteration domain is satisfied the loop will execute. 
Baseline vs. WBBDA 
As previously mentioned we decided on a metric based on the number of sorties 
necessary to destroy a target.  In Figure 69 we can see the cumulative probability 
distribution (sorties to kill target) for our two systems with the varying warhead lethality 
value perturbation.  We will select a 75%-tile; what number of sorties will provide a kill 
75% of the time, to help compare the data obtained.  Two things can be noticed about the 
behavior of the two systems.  First, there was an overall improvement in the number of 
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 sorties needed to destroy a target with the migration to the modified system.  Second, for 
high lethality warheads we get minimal improvement when migrating from the original 
system to the modified one; while the average lethality warhead benefits more from  
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Figure 69: Cumulative probability 
 
WBBDA.  If we take a look at the number of sortie distributions, Figure 70 to Figure 73, 
we can see that the high lethality warhead reduced its variance with the modified system.  
In general the high lethality warhead did not benefit significantly when modified for 
WBBDA.  For an average lethality warhead there is significant variance present in both 
the systems.  The mode for all four Monte Carlo simulations was two sorties per kill.  
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 With the 75% lethality modified system having an average of nineteen occurrences 
higher when compared to the other three data points.  It is of note to mention the 
irregularity of the normal fit based on the data from the baseline average lethality 
warhead.  This irregularity can be attributed to a number of outlier data (7 sorties).  This 
phenomenon was not present on the high lethality warhead and the modified system with 
the average lethality warhead. 
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Figure 70: Baseline 75% lethality 
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Figure 71: Modified 75% lethality 
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Figure 72: Baseline 50% lethality 
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Figure 73: Modified 50% lethality 
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 Architectural Analysis with Executable Models 
The analysis compared the sorties per kill distribution of the Monte Carlo runs.  It 
was assumed that the WBBDA had a 100% accurate detection capability and functions 
were given a normal time delay distribution that didn’t take into account any breakdown 
in communications. 
The executable model was stable within the constraints of our analysis.  Changes 
to the model could be performed with the executable GUI open, making for fast turn 
around and debugging.  There is room for improvement as more representative time 
intervals could be obtained for each function. 
The level of detail of the executable model is an important decision.  The 
complexity of the executable model increases dramatically as we decide to model 
increased numbers of sublevels of the system.  There are also practical reasons not to 
model to the lowest level available.  The fact is that an incomplete or an erroneous rules 
model will limit the amount of detail that can be introduced into the executable model.  
You can not accurately model what you are not aware of or don’t know.  It was found 
desirable to understand one level below from the lowest level implemented into the 
executable model.  The extra level may not be complete; it just needs to be enough 
information to ensure an understanding of the level above it. 
The top level executable provided a good platform to compare the effects from 
changes in the system structure.  For this study we can only compare trends generated by 
the different executables generated.  Even at this level of detail the executable is a valid 
tool when performing preliminary investigations of top level trade studies.  This 
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 statement relies in the ability to generate or obtain a simple and valid rules model for the 
system.  As a preliminary top level trade study you are not that concerned with specific 
detail data, you are more concerned with capturing a representative behavior of the 
system.  This representative behavior can be compared to the behavior of other 
permutations, obtaining insight into which alternative deserves future investigation.  
More accurate distributions are needed to obtain realistic behavior from the executable.  
The extra burden required to obtain the better simulation may not be worth the effort at 
the early concept analysis stage of the lifecycle. 
Summary 
By observing the cumulative probability distribution we can infer that high 
accuracy/lethality warheads combined with WBBDA will have minimal improvement 
over just better munitions.  This can be attributed to the high damage these warheads can 
inflict to the stationary target on the first strike.  If we look at the variance we see a 
significant improvement as depicted by a 94.47% percent difference in their variance, 
implying a more repeatable process for WBBDA-supported strike.  We could infer 
because of their mean, 1.99 strikes for the original and 1.84 strikes for the modified, a 
strike on this type of structure should involve two warheads.  If we look at the average 
lethality warhead case, we see a significant improvement in modifying the system with 
WBBDA.  The percent difference of the mean and variance, was 23.31% and 40.39% 
respectively (see Table 16).  If we look at Figure 69, we see a tendency of the modified  
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 Table 16: Comparison of results 
Mean 
(Sorties) Variance
Mean 
(Sorties) Variance
20.47%
Percent 
Difference
7.83% 50.21% 23.31%
2.97 1.504
1.84 0.257 2.35 0.997
Modified 
System
Baseline 
System
High lethality
warhead
Average Lethality 
Warhead
1.99 0.717
 
 
system with WBBDA and average lethality warheads resembles the behavior of a system 
using high accuracy warheads without WBBDA.  The observed effect could be attributed 
to the lower damage accumulation of the average warhead. 
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 VI.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions 
1) It is possible and useful to directly model an architecture, and use this model to 
perform behavior and performance analysis for the selected concepts. 
a) The architecture must be developed to support this type of analysis, and then it is 
critical that the key products be complete, correct, and consistent.  At a minimum 
the OV-1, OV-5, OV-6, and SV-7 are necessary to obtain representative behavior 
from the architecture.  Additional products may be needed to conduct 
performance analysis, as the current investigation was limited to behavioral 
analysis. 
b) When developing an executable model, complexity increases dramatically as you 
incorporate lower levels of decomposition.  The model should be developed to the 
point where a good representation of the architectural behavior can be obtained.  
It is the author’s impression that modeling to a level 2 decomposition would have 
been too much work for little return.  No matter the level selected for modeling, it 
is beneficial to have available a decomposition at one level below that of the 
model.  The extra level can be used to clarify any ambiguities that may be present 
in higher levels. 
c) Architectures can be used effectively to analyze and evaluate new weapon system 
concepts and modification to existing concepts. 
d) The CORETM environment has promise as an architectural analysis tool.  It is one 
of very few software tools that directly model architectures, thus facilitating 
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 verification, validation and analysis.  The introduction of a more comprehensive 
stochastic capability is essential for the development of more complex executable 
models. 
2) WBBDA has promise as a future weapon system concept.  This analysis is 
preliminary and insufficient; however, some conclusions can be drawn. 
a) The low lethality warhead benefited more from the introduction of the WBBDA 
in the architecture.  At it has a lower rate of damage accumulation, it is more 
sensitive to the time elapsed between attacks.  Further, WBBDA may allow for 
greater sortie efficiency by reducing the average number of warheads needed per 
target. 
b) To obtain the maximum benefit, communication needs to be reliable and timely 
and the ability to accurately detect WBBDA information in a timely fashion may 
be the limiting factor.  The current investigation did not take into account any of 
these issues and the capability of WBBDA will be degraded due to them. 
Recommendations for future research 
1) To obtain a more accurate representation of system behavior and better understand 
the impact of WBBDA on such behavior, it is necessary to make some changes to the 
assumptions and approach for development of the executable model. 
a) Simulate more targets per sortie.  The engagement of multiple targets per flight 
sortie is a more representative wartime scenario. 
b) Allow multiple warheads per target.  As no conventional warhead is 100% lethal, 
it is common practice to deliver multiple warheads to a target.  By allowing 
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 multiple warheads per target it is now possible to investigate how WBBDA 
affects the efficiency (target kills per sortie) of different aircraft payload 
configurations. 
c) Consistent with the discussion, a more meaningful metric would be targets kill per 
aircraft sortie.  This metric can better quantify the effect that WBBDA has on the 
efficient use of battlefield resources. 
d) Implement more representative time intervals.  Time interactions between 
functions can heavily influence the behavior of the architecture, and this should 
be addressed in future investigation.  It is recommended that the different function 
time intervals be prescribed by stochastic modeling. 
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